Infrastructural damage and economic losses are amplified due to centralized systems of verification and governance - a single attack exploiting a vulnerability in the periphery can spread rapidly to every other node using the same verification system, paralyzing the entire system. The case studies demonstrate the range and scale of risks that cyberwarfare poses, which are inherently transnational/transboundary, indiscriminate, and difficult to predict. It exposes the limitations of existing institutions in safeguarding property in the era of digital war.
Rigid boundaries and definitions on what counts as "property" and "property damage" limit actions that can be taken by property institutions to mitigate new risks. For example, current property insurance policies exclude “hostile or warlike action in time of peace or war". This does not take into account the scale of collateral damage of cyberwarfare as seen in the NotPetya attack, which included damages incurred by transnational companies but also local companies based in an unrelated country, connected to the supply chain. It also fails to account for new types of attacks that are designed to destabilize, rather than destruct. The indirect and long-term damages due to destabilization will less likely be accounted for in the existing property risk management structure.
Cyberattacks are often funded through a shadow financial system, involving cryptocurrencies and other forms of unaccounted capital. Beyond being untaxed, this highly mobile, unregulated, and unaccounted capital is divorced from any type of social accountability and concentrates power and political influence. The unaccountable nature of this type of capital increases the likelihood of its use for destabilizing or destructive activities.
